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Building on the relevant international literature, as well as empirical research 
on urban cases, this article determines and discusses five core values of 
good urban governance: responsiveness, effectiveness, procedural justice, 
resilience, and counterbalance. The quest for good governance can take 
various forms. This article focuses on urban governance, and identifies four 
different shifts, with increased emphasis on the real decision makers or the 
ordinary citizens, with increased attention to selective choice or integrative 
deliberation as modes of urban governance. Urban governance and good 
urban governance are not synonymous. This article advocates critical 
reflection, moving beyond the performance bias that tends to accompany 
governance reform.
Keywords
urban governance, good governance, democracy, rule of law, responsiveness, 
effectiveness, procedural justice, resilience, counterbalance, urban regime, 
urban market, urban trust, urban platform.
Good Urban Governance Revisited
This article combines discussions about urban governance with discourse on 
good governance, taking the latter back into the urban realm. Contemporary 
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urban cases are, thus, connected to the long-standing debate, in which the 
Italian town of Siena plays a pivotal role.
In the Siena town hall, we find the world-famous fourteenth-century paint-
ings by Lorenzetti depicting the precepts and effects of good governance in 
the city. The painting Effeti del Buon Governo in Città shows citizens living 
peacefully together, engaging in transactions and alliances. Lorenzetti sug-
gests that these good effects follow from “good governance,” illustrated by 
his Allegoria del Buon Governo in Città. This painting nicely exemplifies 
that good governance is more than “doing good things.” Good governance is 
about doing things in a sound institutional setup, characterized by effective 
checks and balances and countervailing powers—as we have subsequently 
come to call them in the wider framework of the democratic rule of law. As a 
medieval artist, Lorenzetti did, of course, not use these terms but worked with 
images. His allegory of good governance depicts a diversified institutional 
setting that knows no absolute power, but power checked by Lady Justice as 
well as a train of free citizens, and led by cardinal virtues such as prudence, 
temperance, magnanimity, and fortitude.
If we were to make a Buon Governo in Città for today’s urban areas, what 
should we highlight as essential? What qualities and characteristics of urban 
governance need to be stressed? In addressing this question—in social sci-
ence language rather than painting—this article will link up with the relevant 
literature, which has gone through a much-discussed “shift from government 
to governance” (Bevir 2010; Kjaer 2004; Pierre 2000; Rhodes 1996, 2000) 
and appears to be witnessing a further shift from governance to “good gover-
nance” (Ahrens, Weingarth, and Caspers 2010; Bovaird and Löffler 2003; 
Mulgan 2006; Rothstein and Teorell 2008).
The aim of this article is not to present an exhaustive overview of all the 
literature on governance and good governance. The aim is, more modestly, to 
determine the essential elements and dimensions of urban governance and to 
develop a framework for understanding good urban governance. The relevant 
international literature constitutes a means to this end, in addition to empiri-
cal research into the quest for good governance (QGG) in a series of Dutch 
cities.1
Although the terminology on governance has its shortcomings (more 
about this in the next section), it has two major advantages for present pur-
poses. First of all, the governance concept calls our attention to the fact that 
governing in the urban realm involves more than “city hall” as a metaphor for 
monocentric government in the city. “Local government” is no more (and no 
less) than one constituent part of “urban governance.” Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, if we widen the concept of governance to “good gover-
nance,” this will encourage us to reflect more systematically on what quality 
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is in the art of administration, opening the door to a rich and diversified 
understanding of administrative value(s). The urban realm is a suitable test-
ing ground for doing so (Pierre 2005; Stoker 2000).
Urban Governance: Essential Features
As a theoretical construct, “governance” has all the characteristics of a con-
tainer concept. It contains a lot, and it is hard to tell where it exactly begins 
and ends. In Public Administration, not the only discipline that works with 
the concept, governance usually refers to the steering of service domains or 
problem areas characterized by interdependence among various involved 
parties and organizations (Kjaer 2004; Rhodes 2007). The often invoked 
image in governance discourse is that of a hampered government system, 
characterized by limited steering capacity, far removed of a steering monop-
oly (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Pierre 2000; Swyndegouw 2005). Alternative 
steering models would be indispensable in the light of profound technologi-
cal, economic, and social transformations (Rhodes 1997). This would drive 
the fundamental shift “from government to governance,” whereby the former 
is understood as vertical, monocentric, and unilateral steering, and the latter 
horizontal, pluricentric, and multilateral (Bevir 2010; Pierre 2000).
In the international literature, the general concept of “governance” has 
acquired a great many definitions, some of which do and some of which do 
not coincide (Rhodes 2000). All those definitions will not be reproduced 
here. The aim is the reduction, not the reproduction, of complexity. Here, the 
concept of—urban—governance refers to the more or less institutionalized 
working arrangements that shape productive and corrective capacities in 
dealing with—urban—steering issues involving multiple governmental and 
nongovernmental actors. The following subsections will give some further 
explication of the essential elements of this definition.
Working Arrangements, More or Less Institutionalized
Governance literature and practice show that working arrangements may be 
of very different kinds. Government does not always play a leading role in 
this. Sometimes government barely seems to matter: “governing without 
government” as Rhodes (1996) called this in a famous and controversial 
phrase (cf. Peters and Pierre 1998). In the urban realm, one might think of the 
residents’ associations that govern and manage certain neighborhoods in Los 
Angeles seemingly by themselves. Local government in the traditional sense 
seems to play a relatively modest role indeed, but even here it has not disap-
peared out of the picture altogether. Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 
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to mention just one department, can still intervene, even when private secu-
rity does a lot of the day-to-day surveillance.
“Governance without a lot of government” is by no means the only theo-
retical variant. Lowndes and Skelcher (1998), Pierre and Peters (2000), 
Kooiman (2003), Bovaird (2005), and others distinguished different “modes 
of governance,” which would include “networks,” “markets,” and “hierar-
chies.” These are three basic modalities that occur in various blends in exist-
ing urban governance models. In the Los Angeles blend of urban governance, 
the market mechanism and the mode of self-organization are comparatively 
more prominent than, for example, in the Dutch mixture of governance 
modalities, in which government and top-down planning remain relatively 
important (Hendriks and Musso 2004).
In a realistic approach to urban governance, government and hierarchy 
may be downplayed, as city hall is indeed not a city’s control center, but they 
cannot be defined away altogether (Stoker 2011). The idea that modern gov-
ernance is a web of purely horizontal, nonhierarchical relations is an unreal-
istic one, as is the idea that working arrangements in dealing with public 
problems could be purely nonformal, without any official strings attached. 
Governance is a compound of both horizontal and vertical, both nonformal 
and formal arrangements that have structural significance for public issues, 
here in the urban realm (cf. Haus, Heinelt, and Stewart 2005; Peters and 
Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998).
To do something in a particular way, for a limited amount of time (ad hoc), 
does not yet amount to “governance.” This would require some regularity, a 
certain level of institutionalization. The working arrangements of urban gov-
ernance can be understood as institutions in the sense of “rules in use” (E. 
Ostrom 2005).
Productive and Corrective Capacity in Multi-actor Settings
The focus is on working arrangements that shape productive and corrective 
capacity in dealing with—urban—issues by multiple (non)governmental 
parties. This involves, on one hand, the mobilization of organizing and per-
forming abilities, and, on the other, the mobilization of controlling and 
counterbalancing abilities.
Contemporary literature on urban governance tends to focus mostly on 
productive capacity, on the working arrangements that are instrumental in the 
production of public goods and services, in getting things done in the urban 
realm. A good example is the urban regime approach by Stone (1989, 2006). 
With his seminal study on Atlanta, Stone (1989) cut right across the “com-
munity power debate” between elitists and pluralists. In Stone’s view, both 
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these parties were too obsessed with power over (who was having power over 
whom), rather than with power to (how are things actually accomplished?). 
Flyvbjerg (1998), in his detailed study of Aalborg, Denmark, indeed observed 
that the heart of the matter was not so much “Who governs?” but more “How 
is the governing being done?” and how is power being executed in this.
Although just as important, the issue of how checks and balances and 
countervailing powers are institutionalized has received less attention in 
today’s urban governance literature. These issues are usually associated with 
national constitutions. Yet discourse on corrective capacity originated in 
highly polycentric urban domains. As highlighted in the introduction, the 
allegory Buon Governo in Città was all about the checks and balances pro-
vided by institutions and powers around the government of a city like Siena, 
comparable with cities like Florence, Genua, Venice, and other city-states 
(Finer 1999). One of the most spectacular examples of “multiactor gover-
nance” in a sprawling “urban field”’ manifested itself still earlier: Republican 
Rome (not to be confused with the latter-day Empire).2
It is remarkable and a pity that, in the contemporary debate on urban gov-
ernance, the framing of checks and balances is given less consideration than 
in the current discourse on corporate governance, in which the “constitu-
tional” relations between CEOs, boards of directors, supervisory boards, 
assemblies of shareholders, and other stakeholders have been hotly debated 
(Pietrancosta 2009). In urban governance, there are many fragmented 
“offices” that can and should be understood in terms of countervailing forces: 
local councils, neighborhood councils, mayor and aldermen, urban district 
coordinators, higher level co-governments, civil service departments, ombud-
spersons, audit committees, housing corporations, welfare organizations, 
community work agencies, municipal advisory councils, chambers of com-
merce, residents’ organizations, neighborhood management companies, indi-
vidual citizens, and so on. Their added value should be assessed not only in 
productive or instrumental terms but also in terms of corrective capacity (cf. 
V. Ostrom 1982).
Shifts in Urban Governance: Main Directions
One of the clichés of contemporary Public Administration is the so-called, and 
presumably relatively recent, “shift from government to governance.” Such a 
dichotomous “from A-to-B” scheme is a misrepresentation of reality. As said, 
ancient Rome and the city-states of Northern Italy already displayed a lot of 
governance. The same could be said of the equally polycentric urban field of 
the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic (Israel 1995). So, urban governance 
is far from new, although it is real, important, and constantly developing.
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Another thing that we should be aware of is that, in today’s urban arena, 
there is still a substantial role cut out for government within the context of 
urban governance. City hall is not the city’s “cockpit” where all the steering 
comes from, but mayors, city councils, and other official actors, some of 
them supra-local, continue to play a role that often goes beyond the “shadow 
of hierarchy” metaphor coined by Scharpf (1997). The building of an urban 
ring road still needs public funding, the development of a new business park 
depends on zoning, and the weaker parties in the proverbial urban jungle still 
rely on government protection and support.
Rather than thinking in terms of a singular replacement of one thing by 
another, we should be thinking in terms of varied shifts in more or less insti-
tutionalized working arrangements, involving both new and old types of 
steering, both nonformal and formal rules, and both horizontal and vertical 
types of relationships.
Tracking Urban Governance: A Typology
Varied shifts in working arrangements were clearly visible in the Dutch QGG 
research, on which the argument here is partly based (see Note 1; Hendriks 
and Drosterij 2012). Dutch cases of urban governance, extensively analyzed 
in the QGG research, will serve to illustrate the typology of shifts in urban 
governance proposed in Figure 1, but this typology has heuristic value for 
tracing such shifts in urban fields elsewhere in the Western world.3 Emerging 
Figure 1. Shifts in urban governance.
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modalities of urban governance in places like Berlin, Milan, Ghent, Dublin, 
Munich, and Melbourne can and will be linked to the ideal-typical patterns 
proposed below.
To make sense of contemporary shifts in urban governance, Figure 1 dis-
tinguishes between four main directions in which such shifts can be traced:
•• There may be increased attention to and emphasis on “real decision 
makers”—social and economic elites—in the urban realm (A) or, con-
versely, on “ordinary citizens” in the various neighborhoods and dis-
tricts (B).
•• There may be increased attention to and emphasis on “integrative 
deliberation” as a more communicative, comprehensive way of 
approaching alternatives and making collective decisions (C), or, con-
versely, on “selective choice” as a more competitive, exclusive mecha-
nism for weeding out the options and getting to public choice (D).
Track A, emphasizing real decision makers, is founded on the idea that, if 
you really want to accomplish anything in the urban domain, you need to 
accost the business elites and other key figures in society and involve them in 
decision-making processes (cf. Hunter 1953; Lauria 1997; Stone 1989). 
Track B, stressing ordinary citizens, proceeds from the idea that democratic 
government should not only be for citizens but also by citizens and that the 
widespread tendency to govern while ignoring citizens themselves ought to 
be rectified as much as possible (Box 1998; Hoggart and Clark 2000; 
Swyndegouw 2005).
Track C, focusing on more integrative deliberation as a mode of coordina-
tion, is a response to the feeling that a DAD (Decide-Announce-Defend) type 
of rule is outmoded and that talking things through is a better response to 
complex issues; the round table is an apt metaphor here for a more delibera-
tive, communicative, and comprehensive mode of decision making (Berry, 
Portney, and Thompson 1993; Goodin 2008; Uitermark and Duyvendak 
2008). Track D, underlining more selective choice, could be captured in the 
metaphor of free nature, comprising the evolutionary logic of natural selec-
tion. It is founded on the conviction that it is better to have the free play of 
forces do the weeding-out than to expect loquacious conference rooms or 
integral planning cycles to do the work (cf. V. Ostrom 1973; Sunstein 2008; 
Surowiecki 2004).
Following and combining such tracks, urban governance in a particular 
area may distinguish itself from other areas, which is not to say that it will be 
completely distinctive. There are, for instance, almost always planners and 
other policy specialists active in urban governance, and there is bound to be 
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a minimum of rules and regulations for urban planning almost everywhere. 
Figure 1 abstracts from these commonalities and focuses on the divergence in 
urban governance: comparatively strong tendencies to involve real decision 
makers or ordinary citizens, to rely on selective choice or integrative delib-
eration. Four ideal-typical combinations of such tendencies will be discussed 
below, but beforehand, it should be noted that these are indeed ideal types to 
which realities can be compared but never reduced. Some urban areas show 
not a lot of these tendencies—think about some French departments where 
official rule tends to dominate—while other areas display a great deal, pos-
sibly even a variety of types. But to detect such idiosyncrasies, we first need 
more analytical clarity.
The Urban Market
Combining a distinctive individual citizens orientation (B) with a marked 
leaning to a selective mode of choice (D) gives us, in Figure 1, the ideal type 
of the “urban market” (II). While market-like governance was surely boosted 
by Anglo-American New Public Management, which has gained a lot of 
ground over the past two decades, it cannot be simply reduced to it. Already 
in the early 1960s, well before the advent of New Public Management as we 
now know it, V. Ostrom demonstrated how metropolitan governance in the 
United States was strongly predicated on transactional relations between 
decentered suppliers of public goods on one hand and individualized choices 
of citizens on the other (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; cf. Keating 
1991; Toonen 2010). Individual choices of this type are not free of socioeco-
nomic pressures. The urban market tends to be selective rather than compre-
hensive (choices shall be made).
The contemporary customer choice arrangements described by Pierre 
(2000) connect to this variant, as do the many forms of comparative assess-
ment in which public goods, services, policies, and providers are being rated, 
ranked—and, thus, indirectly steered—by citizens cum consumers. The pub-
lic domain is viewed here as a marketplace, and the citizen is seen as the 
central, demanding actor vis-à-vis a scattered supply of public goods and 
services. The urban market hinges on direct consumer input and critical feed-
back related to delivered output.
In urban-market governance, citizens “vote” with their feet, hands, purses, 
Facebook likes, and other electronic thumbs-up or thumbs-down. The actors 
competing for these “votes” can not only be exogenous providers, but they 
can also be citizens themselves. An example is provided by the town of 
Dordrecht in the Netherlands with its participatory budgeting project Citizens 
Turn! This initiative allows ordinary citizens to submit proposals for their 
neighborhood, which are then trimmed down to just a few winning proposals 
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in voting procedure that is competitive and exclusionary at the same time 
(Boluijt, Drosterij, and Hendriks 2012a). Boroughs in the city of Berlin pro-
vide similar choice mechanisms, embedded in a wider process of participa-
tory budgeting (Franzke 2007).
Electronic “information markets” as described by Surowiecki (2004, pp. 
79–83) and Sunstein (2008, pp. 103–45)—in which many individual “bets” 
are aggregated to a collective assessment—are not (yet) common in urban 
governance. In theory, they can help in predicting, for instance, the use of a 
new metro line, the cost of developing a new town square, or other urban 
developments about which people have dispersed independent and real bits 
of information.
The Urban Regime
The ideal type of the urban regime (I) combines a distinctive focus on real 
decision makers (A) with a selective way of making deals and taking deci-
sions in the urban arena (D). In Stone’s version of an urban regime, the selec-
tion mechanism is highly implicit and quasi-evolutionary. Only a small 
selection of societal and political elites—the strongest parties with the most 
scarce and vital resources—“survive” the process of regime formation. They 
seek each other out and enter into a rather exclusive and long-standing joint 
venture, as the black political elite and the white business elite did in Atlanta. 
Not only their alliance but also their agenda was selective (Stone 1989). For 
a European example, we can look at the joint venture of “port barons” and 
political top dogs that drove the immense growth of the Port of Rotterdam in 
the postwar period (C. Wagenaar 1992).
In the Dutch QGG research, a version of an urban regime was found in the 
case of Brainport Eindhoven, with a select gathering of urban government 
officials and top dogs from major knowledge institutions and knowledge-
intensive businesses (most notably Philips) collaborating to boost the knowl-
edge economy in the Eindhoven area (Van Ostaaijen and Schaap 2012). The 
Brainport regime has a marked elitist and instrumentalist focus in common 
with the urban regime type found in places like Atlanta and Chicago (Stone 
1989, 2006) but is explicitly “tripartite” where the American cases typically 
bring two different worlds together. The quasi-corporatist, tripartite twist to 
the urban regime is also visible in another European case: the Northern-Milan 
Development Agency working on the basis of a three-party agreement, forged 
in the 1990s, between state government, trade unions, and private-sector rep-
resentatives (Gualini 2005).
An urban regime can be highly productive, but the social and political 
legitimation tends to be problematic, as Stone (1989) frankly acknowledged. 
There is little room for ordinary citizens, but this is not to say that the urban 
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regime only serves the interests of the city’s top dogs; their connected power 
is not so much “power over” (controlling) but rather “power to” (productive), 
and this may well be in the citizen’s best interest—at least, according to urban 
regime theory (cf. DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993; Harding 1994; Lauria 
1997; Stoker 1995; Stone 1989).
The Urban Trust
Combining a strong focus on a decision-making elite (A) with an emphasis 
on a more integrative and deliberative approach (C) produces the heuristic 
type of the urban trust (III). The urban trust brings “trustees” of a wider range 
of interested parties together in a more communicative and inclusive fashion 
than the urban regime. An apt illustration is the Let’s Make This Town 
Together initiative in the Dutch city of Zwolle (Boluijt, Drosterij, and 
Hendriks 2012b). The definition of “Together” accommodates a wide array 
of constituencies and institutions. One of these is the city library, an institu-
tion that would be an unlikely candidate for participation in an American-
style urban regime. Citizens, however, remain in the background; much is 
expected from cooperating trustees.
The urban trust finds a good breading ground in the constitutional setting 
of the European Rhineland, where consensualism, consociationalism, power-
dispersal, and power-sharing are strongly institutionalized (Daalder 1987; 
Lijphart 1999). Another good illustration is the ROM (Ruimtelijke Ordening 
en Milieu) network developed in and around the Belgian city of Ghent (De 
Rynck and Voets 2005). This is typically a multilevel and multisectoral net-
work, connecting not only leading figures of various levels of government 
with responsibilities in the canal area of Ghent but also many stakeholders 
with economic, environmental, and spatial interests. The name of the game is 
“integral planning,” and the approach is comparatively inclusive. The ROM 
initiative has won a number of prizes in spatial planning, and is generally 
perceived as a successful cooperative, but De Rynck and Voets (2005, pp. 
177–82) also noted that citizens were far removed from the deliberations, 
which tended to “fly over their heads” at a high level of abstraction and 
technicality.
The urban trust model may find fertile soil in the European Rhineland, but 
it is not confined to it. The SPCs (Strategic Planning Committees) developed 
in a city like Dublin, Ireland, come remarkably close to its logic (Callahan 
2005; Loughlin 2011). SPCs can work for various purposes (economic devel-
opment, transport, housing, environmental and general services), but they are 
always composed of political representatives (two-thirds local councilors, 
9–12 members) and representatives of various social interests (one-third 
societal stakeholders, 3–4 members). This governance model reaches out to 
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civil society, but it does not come as close to the citizenry as the urban plat-
form aspires to come (Noveck 2009; H. Wagenaar and Duiveman 2012).
The Urban Platform
In the ideal type of the urban platform (IV), a marked emphasis on integration 
and deliberation (C) is combined with a strong focus on ordinary citizens in 
neighborhoods and the city at large (B) The public realm is envisioned as a 
wide and open platform on which everyone—emphatically also the individ-
ual citizen—can have a say. The urban platform revolves around dialogue, 
not contest; it institutionalizes a comprehensive rather than exclusive 
approach to alternatives and collective decisions (cf. Box 1998; Fung 2004; 
Goodin 2008).
Dutch towns know many variations on this theme. A nice example from 
the QGG research is the Neighborhood Tables initiative in Breda, a citizen 
participation project involving residents, housing corporations, and the local 
council. Neighborhood Tables aim to draw policy makers and citizens closer 
together and to improve mutual understanding, general levels of knowledge, 
and mutual perceptions in neighborhoods where such Tables are held. The 
Neighborhood Tables initiative suits the increasing consideration given to 
“interactive communication” and “appreciative inquiry” in this town (Van 
Ostaaijen and Drosterij 2011). It can be viewed as an expression of the so-
called “third generation of citizen participation,” which brings government 
officials and citizens together with an increasing emphasis on the latter (cf. H. 
Wagenaar and Duiveman 2012).
Neighborhood Tables are a smaller-scale alternative to the Neighborhood 
Councils that have developed in many cities, ranging from Portland and Los 
Angeles in the United States to Lille and Munich in Europe (Berry, Portney, 
and Thompson 1993; Cole 2011; Musso et al. 2006). Munich is an example 
of a city that has widely and consistently invested in the urban platform not 
only through its Neighborhood Councils but also through the “Munich 
Forum,” an open platform for deliberation about the entire city and its neigh-
borhoods since 1968, when grassroots protest triggered the establishment of 
such an arrangement (Hendriks 1999a, pp. 169–72). More recently, Melbourne 
has developed a Planning Wiki, integrating new web-based technology and 
social media, in an attempt to generate wider public input and creativity in 
urban design (Noveck 2009).
Whether such shifts in governance actually manage to get any closer to 
good governance is, of course, another matter. The idea that governance is 
good in itself—and that, therefore, governance and good governance are 
practically synonymous—is a fallacy: Varieties of governance may work 
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well in the urban domain but need not do so at all. This requires critical 
reflection, informed by essential quality standards.
Good Urban Governance: Core Values
The “goodness” of governance cannot be taken for granted but should time 
and again be assessed in connection to a solid frame of reference. This goes 
for the urban domain as well as for any other field of public concern (Ahrens, 
Weingarth, and Caspers 2010; Andrews 2010; Mulgan 2006).
The simplest definition of good governance is: governance that qualifies 
as good for some reason. An instance of urban governance could be qualified 
as good to the extent in which the pertaining working arrangements operate 
well with regard to essential quality standards. But what are these? Debates 
in public administration on this issue tend to be wide-ranging, mentioning a 
great many things, often in a not very systematic fashion. Here are just a few 
examples:
•• The United Nations (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP 
1977]) have been using their own set of quality standards for quite 
some time: participation; strategic vision, rule of law; transparency; 
responsiveness; consensus orientation; equity building; accountabil-
ity; effectiveness and efficiency.
•• The Council of Europe (2008) defined “Twelve Principles of Good 
Democratic Practice at Local Level” (comprising in fact more than 12 
principles): fair conduct of elections, representation, and participation; 
responsiveness; efficiency and effectiveness; openness and transpar-
ency; rule of law; ethical conduct; competence and capacity; innova-
tion and openness to change; sustainability and long-term orientation; 
sound financial management; human rights; cultural diversity and 
social cohesion; accountability.
•• The Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Ministerie 
van BZK 2009) drafted a Good Governance Code, defining seven core 
qualities (which comprise, all in all, 11 standards): openness and 
integrity, good service provision, participation, goal-orientedness and 
efficiency, legitimacy and justice, self-correction and learning capac-
ity, accountability.
Appreciating Good Governance: A Catalogue of Values
Here, a somewhat different approach is taken, informed by the Dutch QGG 
research (see Note 1; Hendriks and Drosterij 2012), in addition to academic 
debate on quality in democracy and the rule of law (Bovaird 2005; Drosterij 
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2008; Haus, Heinelt, and Stewart 2005; Heinelt, Sweeting, and Gemitis 2006; 
Hendriks 2010; Mulgan 2006; Pierre 2009; Rothstein and Teorell 2008). This 
has led to the construction of a good governance values catalogue, covering 
five core values: responsiveness, effectiveness, procedural justice, resilience, 
and counterbalance. Table 1 helps to clarify how these values interlock.
The good governance values catalogue collapses many of the specific val-
ues mentioned above into fewer and more fundamental categories. This is 
done not only because the human mind can deal better with a smaller number 
of items but also and primarily because the good governance debate is in dire 
need of the second step in the evolutionary process of “variation and 
Table 1. Good Governance Values Catalogue.
Input Values 
(What Enters the 
System)
Output Values
(What Leaves the 
System)
System Values
(What Constitutes the 
System)
Democracy as responsive 
‘rule by the people’
Democracy as effective 
‘rule for the people’
Democracy as resilient 






















Rule of Law/Rechtstaat as
‘rule by the law,’ ‘rule for the law’






Related process values: (*)
Due process, lawfulness, correctness,
predictability; integrity and civility;
transparency and accountability; proportionality
and fair play; impartiality and equality of rights
Related system values:
Countervailing powers and 
responsibilities, checks 
and balances, oversight 
and surveillance,
supervision and control
*These are called process values, because lawfulness, correctness, fair play, and the like 
pertain to the entire process that—in systems theory—connects inputs to outputs. The over-
arching value of procedural justice is also in essence a process value—not confined to either 
the input side or the output side of governance.
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selection.” Besides a more systematic selection, this requires a consistent 
focus on values of good governance, not to be confused with values of good 
politics (cf. Hendriks 1999b; Mulgan 2006). Substantial values, such as free-
dom, equality, solidarity, physical and social security, poverty-redemption, 
peace-keeping, sustainability, and the like, are surely relevant to normative 
political debate, but good governance values pertain to something else. They 
are not so much about the “good life,” but rather about the “good order,” the 
sound setup and the proper ground rules of the operating system.4
There are different ways of discussing the catalogue of values. We could 
follow the columns distinguishing between input, output, and system values. 
Alternatively, we could follow the rows distinguishing between values 
inspired by democratic theory (the upper half of the table), and by theories of 
the Rechtsstaat and the rule of law (the lower half). Below, the two routes are 
combined, aspiring to call due attention to
•• Responsiveness and effectiveness: the dominant values in contempo-
rary thinking about good governance in terms of inputs and outputs 
(what goes in and what comes out); undeniably important, but there is 
more to good governance;
•• Procedural justice: a container concept for process values relating 
to the entire chain of actions connecting inputs and outputs in 
governance;
•• Resilience and counterbalance: classic system values, nowadays 
somewhat subdued, pertaining to the constitution of the system as 
such (independently of what goes in, comes out, or proceeds in 
between).
Responsiveness and Effectiveness
Democratic theory often refers to Lincoln, who in his famous Gettysburg 
Address of 1863 declared that democracy as rule of the people (the contrac-
tion of demos and kratos) ought to be rule by the people and rule for the 
people as well. Following this line of thinking, Scharpf (1997, 1999) observed 
that democratic governance, whether of a direct or indirect kind, must be 
prompted by the people so as to acquire “input legitimacy” and must produce 
added value for the people so as to acquire “output legitimacy.”
According to Putnam (1993), good democratic governance “not only con-
siders the demands of its citizenry (that is, is responsive) but also acts effica-
ciously upon these demands (that is, is effective)” (p. 63). A governance 
model may be considered responsive to the degree and way in which it has 
organized representation, participation, accessibility, and openness. A model 
of governance may be considered effective to the degree and way in which it 
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shows an ability to actually do things, solve problems, and deliver value for 
money.5
In the urban domain, responsiveness and effectiveness are relevant values 
that are often pursued in programs aiming to further urban governance. One 
of the cases in the Dutch QGG research, the Eindhoven Brainport project, 
explicitly aimed to accomplish added (economic) value for the urban region 
(Van Ostaaijen and Schaap 2012). It was mostly focused on output legiti-
macy, and not so much on input legitimacy, just like the urban regime cum 
growth coalition was that Stone (1989) had witnessed in Atlanta. In the case 
of Breda, it was the other way around. There, Neighborhood Tables were 
established to improve openness and rapport with the citizens on the input 
side of the urban governance model. For the establishment of Neighborhood 
Councils in cities like Los Angeles and Lille, this was also the prime concern 
(Cole 2011; Musso et al. 2006; Van Ostaaijen and Drosterij 2012).
Procedural Justice
Good governance amounts to more than gratifying the citizenry, let alone a 
momentary majority of citizens. This is central to the idea of the Rechtsstaat 
or the “rule of law,” which complements the idea of democracy as the “rule 
of the people.”6
Regarding process values, we may think of the officially-prescribed 
Algemene Beginselen van Behoorlijke Bestuur (General Principles of 
Appropriate Administration) in the Netherlands or similar process values 
(accountability, transparency, ethical conduct, human rights, rule of law) 
included in the good governance code issued by the Council of Europe 
(2008). The values catalogue presented in Table 1 lists the crucial ones under 
the umbrella term “procedural justice,” bringing together more legal (lawful-
ness, accountability, equal rights) and more interactionist (correctness, integ-
rity, civility) types of values. Rothstein and Teorell (2008) considered one 
element out of this set—impartiality—as the essence of good governance. 
However important this element is in and of itself, relying on impartiality 
alone would undervalue other essential standards of procedural justice (cf. 
Esaiasson 2010; Tyler and Darley 2000; Tyler and Huo 2002).
Procedural justice is no less a core value for good governance in the urban 
domain than responsiveness or effectiveness. Those involved in urban gover-
nance have legitimate procedural expectations and rights, and they are fully 
entitled to demand respect to them, even if urban governance is said to be 
working by and for the demos at large. Especially where formal political 
rights and deeply-felt social norms concerning due process converge—as in 
principles such as fair play, equality, and proportionality—sensitivity to this 
dimension of good governance tends to be well developed among the 
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citizenry. Against this background, it is remarkable that only one case out of 
the eight cases in the Dutch QGG study specifically prioritized process val-
ues in the attempts to improve urban governance. Only for the Neighborhood 
Tables, initiative in Breda was due process a top priority (Van Ostaaijen and 
Drosterij 2012).
Resilience and Counterbalance
Good governance is not only related to what goes in, comes out, or proceeds 
in between, but it is also, and essentially, related to the way in which the 
overarching system as such is constituted, and the way in which the constitu-
tional whole of offices, organs, positions, and relations is assembled—
robustly or not (cf. V. Ostrom 1982; Toonen 2010).
Some parts of democratic theory tend to stress the importance of resil-
ience, more specifically, the self-supporting, dynamic stability of the demo-
cratic system. A resilient, dynamically-stable democracy invests 
systematically in its ability to remain standing when pressurized and to 
remain united when divided, “E Pluribus Unum” (Stassen 1942). In postwar 
Germany, for example, this was reflected in the notion of the wehrhafte 
Demokratie: the kind of democracy that would keep centrifugal forces in 
check with centripetal institutions (Almond and Verba 1980). Constitutional 
thinking about the Rechtsstaat in continental Europe and the rule of law in 
Anglo-American discourse tends to be more focused on systematic counter-
balance and the separation of powers. Good governance, here, is all about the 
balancing of interests, the institutionalization of countervailing forces and 
responsibilities, of actors, offices, and organs keeping each other in check 
(Alexander 2001; Rosanvallon 2008).
System values, such as resilience and counterbalance, are often associated 
with the modern state while their true cradle is really the urban polity. As 
noted in earlier sections, the seeds of constitutional thinking about robust rela-
tions had been sown in Republican Rome and other European city-states many 
centuries before the advent of the modern state. In thinking about good urban 
governance today also, we should be paying close attention to system values. 
There is every reason to do so. Cleavages and tensions between different 
groups of people characterize the urban realm (Duyvendak, Hendriks, and van 
Niekerk 2009; Putnam 2007). The urban world is full of planning disasters and 
policy fiascos, demonstrating how the arrangement of proper checks and bal-
ances is debatable, to say the least (Flyvbjerg 2003; Hall 1982).
In the Dutch QGG study, only one out of eight cases gave top priority to 
system values; the Let’s Make This Town Together initiative in Zwolle was 
first and foremost dedicated to furthering resilience (in Dutch: veerkracht) of 
the urban governance system. Governance reforms in the cases of Almere 
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and Dordrecht were only secondarily geared to system values; furthering 
practical performance—improving input and output legitimacy—was 
deemed more important here (Hendriks and Drosterij 2012).
The constitution of urban governance is impacted by the establishment of 
new regulatory powers, decentered offices, supervisory arrangements like 
urban audit offices, municipal ombudsmen, and the like. Issues of supervi-
sion and control are no less important for the urban arena than they are for the 
corporate world, where such issues are nowadays hotly debated under the 
title of “corporate governance” (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella 2003; Denis and 
McConnell 2003). Bringing the constitution back in—not only in conceptual 
discourse on good democratic governance but also in practical attempts to get 
closer to this in the urban realm—seems to be a challenge for years to come.
Conclusion: Bringing the Democratic Rule of Law 
Back In
If we were to paint a contemporary Buon Governo in Città, inspired by 
Lorenzetti’s famous panels in Siena, what should we highlight as essential? 
This article suggests the following answer: responsiveness, effectiveness, 
procedural justice, resilience, and counterbalance. These can be viewed as 
core values of good urban governance. (They could even be depicted by a 
creative artist. The murals and stained glass windows in some of the older 
European town halls might serve as sources of inspiration.)
An idealist might argue that urban governance should always strive for 
flawless performance on all the five core values of good urban governance. A 
more realistic approach, advocated in this article, would allow a situation-
sensitive logic of “step-dancing” (Hood 1998), alternating heightened atten-
tion to particular values, in combination with a sense of “good enough 
governance” (Grindle 2007)—acceptable quality levels need to be observed 
all around, but not everything can be perfect all the time.
There are several ways of promoting good urban governance values or to 
attempt making improvements to some of them. Many arrangements are being 
tried and tested in practice, as the various cases mentioned in the previous sec-
tions testify. Varied shifts in urban governance, divergent movements on the 
conceptual map depicted in Figure 1, can be detected in the real world. 
Governance theory is supposed to be indifferent as to the specifics of gover-
nance reform: moving this way or that way, more or less citizen-oriented, more 
or less deliberative, in the theory of governance, it does not really matter—“if 
only things work well.”
Although the pragmatic philosophy accompanying governance theory 
appears to be refreshing, this article has also pointed out two problems with 
this approach. First, governance discourse does not always adhere to the 
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maxim of pragmatism and ideological indifference, and often implicitly 
assumes that horizontal methods are better than vertical ones, and nonformal 
methods better than formal ones. It is not always acknowledged that “govern-
ment” can be of crucial importance within “governance” or that networks 
often develop “in the shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1997).
Second, “if only things work well” is often taken in a singular sense. Pierre 
(2000) was right to criticize the performance bias, the preoccupation with 
instrumental norms, and the coincident neglect of wider democratic values in 
thinking about governance. This is particularly noticeable in the urban realm, 
where down-to-earth concerns are never far away. The argument presented 
here concurs with Pierre’s appeal to “bring democracy back in,” provided 
that this is not limited to bringing the voice of the citizen back in. Surely, 
citizen-responsive governance is valuable, but there is more to good urban 
governance than that.
This article has made a case for bringing the democratic rule of law—
broadly defined, with all the values attached—back into thinking about good 
(urban) governance. Only then can we provide a well-founded and advanced 
answer to the question if and how urban governance of whatever kind will 
also imply good governance.
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Notes
1. In addition to the international literature, this article builds on the QGG (Quest 
for Good Governance) research project, financed by Nicis Institute for Urban 
Research in the Netherlands. This QGG research was focused on urban gover-
nance reforms in eight Dutch cities (Amsterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven, Zwolle, 
Dordrecht, Tilburg, Almere, and Breda), resulting in an edited volume (Hendriks 
and Drosterij 2012) with case studies provided by a host of authors (Bram 
Boluijt, Marcel Boogers, Gerard Drosterij, Robert Duiveman, Frank Hendriks, 
Koen van der Krieken, Tamara Metze, Julien van Ostaaijen, Linze Schaap, 
Hendrik Wagenaar, and Sabine van Zuydam). The research was guided by the 
framework presented here, which was in its turn also refined by the research. The 
author acknowledges all those mentioned for, thus, sharpening the understanding 
of (good) urban governance. Special thanks go to Gerard Drosterij, who helped 
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to prepare earlier drafts of this argument in Dutch. The editors of Urban Affairs 
Review (UAR) and two anonymous reviewers are thanked for valuable com-
ments and suggestions.
2. The governance of Republican Rome was divided over many public positions 
and private parties (often families), who more or less balanced each other out. 
Day-to-day governing was in the hands of two consuls, elected for just one year 
at a time, who were to share power with a powerful Senate, and with assem-
blies and tribunes of the people. Classic authors, such as, Polybios and Cicero 
celebrated and defended the extensive system of countervailing forces, which 
was codified in Roman law but even more so in cultural norms and social codes 
(Finer 1999; Macchiavelli [1513] 1998).
3. Why urban areas in the Western world? In addition to practical limitations in 
terms of available research and literature, there is a more fundamental point: 
What urban areas in the Western world have in common is that public issues have 
to be managed within the confines of the democratic rule of law, which implies a 
particular constitutional framework that does not apply to urban governance in, 
say, Singapore or Beijing.
4. One could apply the metaphor of a computer here, which also needs some fun-
damental prescriptions, defined in the operating system, to function properly. 
Although one should never push a metaphor too far, this one does help to see 
merits and limits: A sound operating system may be the basis for good programs, 
but these do not automatically result from it.
5. Dahl (1994) referred to “participation” versus “effectiveness,” and Lijphart 
(1999) referred to “‘representation” versus “performance,” but to all intents 
and purposes, these are all about the same thing: input legitimacy versus output 
legitimacy, or, in terms of their more generic synonyms, responsiveness, and 
effectiveness (cf. Hoggart and Clark 2000).
6. Forcing the issue, one could distinguish input values (“rule by the law,” or gov-
ernance that abides by, follows, respects, and internalizes the law) and output 
values (“rule for the law,” or governance that expresses, operationalizes, admin-
isters, and enforces the law), but the essentials of procedural justice actually 
relate to the entire process connecting inputs and outputs. Therefore, the input/
output distinction is not highlighted in Table 1 when it comes to process values.
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